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THE REVENUE RULE: A COMMON LAW 
DOCTRINE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
BRENDA MALLINAK* 
The revenue rule, a common law doctrine with origins in the 
eighteenth century, is a battleground in the twenty-first century as 
criminal and civil courts address liability for acts of smuggling that 
contravene revenue laws of foreign governments.  In its modern form 
the revenue rule generally allows courts to decline entertaining suits 
or enforcing foreign tax judgments or foreign revenue laws; but in the 
context of the present litigation, the scope of the rule is far from cer-
tain.  This Article presents the evolution of the common law rule in 
English courts and its adaptation by American courts and examines 
the application of the revenue rule in the twentieth century by com-
mon law jurisdictions.  The Article traces the revenue rule from its 
beginnings as a judicial refusal to allow private parties to negate their 
contracts on the basis of a violation of foreign laws through its evolu-
tion into a judicial refusal to allow a foreign government to enforce its 
tax laws and raise revenues through the domestic judiciary.  Addi-
tionally, the Article detours shortly into the revenue rule’s place in 
the relationships between sister states in the United States.  Finally, 
the Article analyzes a criminal case in which the United States Su-
preme Court recently considered the scope of the revenue rule and a 
civil case remanded to the Second Circuit by the Supreme Court in 
light of the ruling in the criminal case. 
Having established the viability of the doctrine, the Article ad-
dresses the use of treaties to circumvent the rule.  The Article con-
cludes that treaties are underutilized as a mechanism to allow collec-
tion of tax judgments originating in one jurisdiction when 
enforcement is sought in a second jurisdiction, and that the reluctance 
demonstrated by the U.S. Senate and the Executive Branch to enter 
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treaty agreements to facilitate cross-border tax collection precludes 
judicial interference. 
The revenue rule is one basis of defense in criminal wire fraud 
prosecutions and civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) actions.  These actions and the lack of treaty collection 
procedures have resulted in a debate within the legal community re-
garding the foundation of the doctrine and its continued viability.  
This Article presents the main arguments on both sides of the debate.  
Finally, the Article concludes that the revenue rule has an important 
role in the realm of international relations and should not be dis-
carded merely because it causes some untoward results in the smug-
gling cases.  The Article discusses other methods of tax collection and 
why their use relieves courts of the necessity for examining the reve-
nue laws of foreign nations to enforce foreign tax judgments or to as-
sist in the collection of taxes. 
I.  FROM WHENCE THE DOCTRINE COMES 
The earliest reported case referencing the revenue rule was de-
cided in 1729.1  In Attorney General v. Lutwydge, import duties were 
sought on tobacco sold at Dumfries, Scotland in an English court.2  
The Attorney General argued that “the question now did not depend 
upon the residence of the parties, but upon the nature of the matter 
for which the bond was given.”3  Lord Chief Baron Pengelly, in 
agreement with the Attorney General’s description of the action, held 
that “[b]efore the union this court had no jurisdiction of the revenues 
in Scotland, and therefore the question is, whether the statute is not 
exclusive of us, since it is giving a farther jurisdiction to them who had 
it exclusive of us before.”4  The English court was unwilling to enforce 
a bond executed in Scotland for Scottish duties on tobacco, because 
the obligation was a foreign tax obligation.5 
During the remainder of the eighteenth century, English courts 
addressed the applicability of the laws of foreign nations with respect 
to the enforcement of commercial transactions.  In Boucher v. Law-
 
 1. Att’y Gen. v. Lutwydge, (1729) 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div.). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  Scotland and England were separate countries until the Act of Union constitution-
ally united Scotland and England into the Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707.  NORMAN 
DAVIES, THE ISLES, A HISTORY 624-27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
 5. Id. 
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son6, Justice Lee, in his concurring opinion, stated: “[T]he right of an 
English subject cannot be altered by the general law of any other 
country.”7  Lawson, the ship owner, hired Fletcher, to serve as master 
of his ship.  Fletcher accepted a parcel of Portuguese gold from 
Boucher for delivery in London.8  Portugal’s law proscribed the ex-
port of gold.9  Boucher, who was ready to pay the freight charges, 
sought delivery from Lawson, who failed to deliver.10  Lawson pled he 
did not possess the gold, and that it was “usual when any gold is ex-
ported from Portugal to this kingdom, for the master of the vessel to 
take the whole freight to his own use, without accounting for any part 
of it to his owners.”11  In other words, Lawson claimed that Fletcher 
had made off with the gold. 
As a defense against the claim of master/servant liability, Lawson 
offered the illegality of the export of gold under Portuguese law.12  
Lord Chief Justice Hardwicke explained that “trade prohibited by the 
laws of England is of material consequence, and it is said that the par-
ties in that case shall receive no relief, as they are both participes 
criminis.”13  But upon consideration of a foreign law, Lord Hardwicke 
posited that “goods are prohibited to be exported by the laws of any 
foreign country from whence they are brought, therefore the parties 
should have no remedy or action here, it would cut off all benefit of 
such trade from this kingdom which would be of very bad conse-
quence.”14  Because the law was Portuguese, Lawson could not raise it 
in his defense before an English court.  Lord Hardwicke concluded: 
“[I]t does not seem that the unlawfulness of this trade in Portugal, 
since it is lawful in England, will have any effect on the determination 
of this case.”15  Thus, the enforcement of a commercial contract was 
separated from consideration of foreign laws criminalizing the subject 
of the contract. 
Lord Mansfield’s famous utterance, “no country ever takes no-
tice of the revenue laws of another,” occurred in an action in assump-
 
 6. (1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 55, 55 (K.B.). 
 7. Id. at 56. 
 8. Id. at 53. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. (1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 55, 55 (K.B.). 
 13. Id. at 55. 
 14. Id. at 55-56. 
 15. Id. at 56. 
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sit to enforce payment on a contract for the delivery of tea.16  Holman 
contracted to deliver tea to Johnson in Dunkirk, France, and Johnson 
intended to smuggle  the tea into England in violation of England’s 
tea tax.17  Johnson, without proof that Holman and his partner were 
party to the smuggling scheme, offered as a defense the illegality of 
smuggling the tea into England.18  Lord Mansfield, under England’s 
choice of law rule, applied the law of Dunkirk and found a valid con-
tract complete upon delivery.19  Lord Mansfield noted that the law of 
contract in Dunkirk would not take notice of England’s revenue law 
regarding the tea, and, with the concurrence of three other judges, 
discharged the rule for a new trial.20  Domestic revenue laws were not 
sufficient to void a contract construed under foreign commercial law.  
An English court, applying French law to a contract case, ignored an 
English tax provision to enforce the contract.  
Again in 1779, Lord Mansfield applied the revenue rule in 
Planche v. Fletcher.21  Planche sued an insurance company for failure 
to pay a claim upon seizure and condemnation of goods shipped from 
England to France.22  Because French customs duties were quite high 
on goods imported from England, shipping documents indicated that 
the ships stopped in Ostend before sailing to France, thus avoiding 
part of the French duties.23  Fletcher claimed fraud on the underwrit-
ers, because the ship was intended to go only from London to Nantz, 
without stopping in Ostend.24  Lord Mansfield found no fraud since 
the practice “in this case was proved to be the constant course of the 
trade, and notoriously so to everybody.”25  He further stated that 
“[o]ne nation does not take notice of the revenue laws of another.”26  
Yet, the decisions in these cases lacked supporting rationale and sim-
ply offered the proposition that revenue laws were not to be consid-
ered. 
 
 16. Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.). 
 17. Id. at 1120. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1121. 
 20. Id. at 1122. 
 21. (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 164 (K.B.). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 164-65. 
 24. Id. at 164. 
 25. Id. at 165. 
 26. Id. 
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Although not usually cited as an example of one of the first ap-
pearances of the revenue rule, Lutwydge most closely annunciates the 
modern version of the rule that one nation does not enforce a reve-
nue judgment of another nation.27  The other three cases discount 
both foreign and domestic revenue laws in determining whether a 
plaintiff is entitled to have his commercial contract enforced despite 
some taint of illegality.  A concern for the vitality of trade and the 
certainty of contractual trade agreements appears to outweigh the 
English courts’ concern with the enforcement of revenue laws.  That 
the subject of these cases are tea that is intended to be smuggled, ille-
gally exported gold, and false shipping documents is of particular in-
terest in the twenty-first century when the smuggling of cigarettes and 
alcohol gives rise to criminal and civil actions in U.S. courts and the 
use of the revenue rule as a defense.28  The scope of the revenue rule 
is broadest at this juncture, and stands for both the proposition that 
the domestic or foreign revenue laws of a state will not be allowed to 
interfere with commercial obligations and domestic courts will not en-
force the collection of foreign taxes.  This Article next examines how 
courts continue to employ the revenue rule and its evolution in the 
United States and other common law jurisdictions. 
II.  THE REVENUE RULE IN EARLY AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Early Cases 
The earliest consideration of the revenue rule in the United 
States occured in state court in 1806.  In Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 
the Supreme Court of New York recognized the revenue rule.29  Lud-
low sought enforcement in an action of assumpsit of a promissory 
note issued by Van Rensselaer in Paris.30  The note did not bear a 
stamp required under French law.  The maker of the note, Van Rens-
selaer, resided in New York, and the note was to be paid in New 
York.31  The court, relying in part on Holman v. Johnson, held, “[a]s 
we do not sit here to enforce the revenue laws of other countries, it is 
perfectly immaterial, in a suit before us, whether or not the note was 
 
 27. (1729) 145 Eng. Rep. 674, 674 (Ex. Div.).  
 28. See discussion infra Part V. 
 29. 1 Johns. 93, 94 (N.Y. 1806). 
 30. Id. at 93. 
 31. Id. 
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stamped according to the laws of France.”32  The New York court, 
like the English courts, was unwilling to allow a party to default on an 
agreement or contract based on a defense that a foreign revenue pro-
vision was violated. 
The revenue rule impacted court decisions in the United States 
when individual states sought enforcement of tax levies against sister 
states.  State courts adopted the revenue rule as part of the common 
law heritage inherited from England, and generally were reluctant to 
involve themselves in the enforcement or evaluation of sister state tax 
laws.  Maryland and the City of Baltimore sought enforcement of a 
judgment entered by the highest court in Maryland from a New York 
resident who demurred and invoked the revenue rule.33  The New 
York court, after analy zing taxes as contractual obligations, held that 
“it is a principle universally recognized that the revenue laws of one 
country have no force in another.”34  The demurrers were sustained.35 
An attempt to collect inheritance taxes from non-residents fared 
no better.36  A resident of Colorado died in New York, and his will 
was probated in New York.37  Colorado had no notice of the proceed-
ings and no provision was made to pay Colorado transfer taxes.38  
Colorado asserted a tax liability against the executrix and the benefi-
ciaries.39  The New York court first addressed the constitutional due 
process implications of Colorado seeking to extract a tax on property 
located outside its borders.40  The New York court then admonished 
Colorado that it is a “well-settled principle of private international 
law which precludes one state from acting as a collector of taxes for a 
sister state and from enforcing its penal or revenue laws as such.  The 
rule is universally recognized that the revenue laws of one state have 
no force in another.”41  The court applied a rule crafted to address ju-
 
 32. Id. at 95. 
 33. Maryland v. Turner, 132 N.Y 173, 174 (1911). 
 34. Id. at 176 (citing Marshall v. Sherman, 42 N.E. 419 (N.Y. 1895)). 
 35. Id.; but see Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 332-33 (1843) (recognizing the revenue rule 
but accepting jurisdiction over a case seeking damages from the assessors and selectmen of the 
town of Chester, Vermont upon the assertion that the town incorrectly computed the Plaintiff’s 
property tax while he resided there and imprisoned him for non-payment.  The court awarded 
damages in the amount of the taxes). 
 36. Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N.E. 357, 360 (N.Y. 1921). 
 37. Id. at 358. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 358-60. 
 41. Id. at 360.  
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dicial consideration of foreign revenue laws, and applied it to the rela-
tionships between domestic states to disallow a state court from en-
forcing tax collection efforts of a state seeking taxes from the first 
state’s residents. 
Court cases decided through the 1920s demonstrate an attitude 
in the judiciary that a state’s ability and decision to tax its residents 
was a matter left up to each state.  Yet, the courts, generally applied 
the revenue rule, which originally addressed foreign taxes, to excuse 
enforcement of cross-border tax obligations between states.  Against 
this background of state court judgments, the Second Circuit ad-
dressed the effort by one state to collect taxes in a second state, and 
for the first time a justification for the revenue rule appeared.42  
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court issued an opin-
ion that limits the revenue rule in the interstate context through the 
application of a constitutional requirement.43  First, the Article exam-
ines the Second Circuit case setting forth the rationale for the reve-
nue rule.  The Article then presents the Supreme Court’s abrogation 
of the revenue rule between sister states. 
B. Learned Hand in Moore v. Mitchell44 
Moore, the treasurer of Grant County, Indiana, brought suit in 
federal court in New York seeking payment of a tax liability from ex-
ecutors of a taxpayer’s will.45  Indiana assessed taxes for a twenty-
three year period of residence prior to the taxpayer’s death, which oc-
curred while he was resident in another state.46  Judge Manton, in af-
firming the dismissal of the action, found the effort by Indiana to col-
lect taxes in New York “repugnant to the settled principles of private 
international law, which preclude one state from acting as a collector 
of taxes for a sister state, and from enforcing its penal or revenue laws 
as such.  The revenue laws of one state have no force in another.”47  
Manton stated that the taxing power of a state is limited by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution and held, “Indiana’s political 
subdivision, Grant County, is limited in the payment of taxes to prop-
erty found within its boundaries.”48 
 
 42. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 600 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 43. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 268 (1935).  
 44. Moore, 30 F.2d at 600. 
 45. Id. at 601. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 602. 
 48. Id. (citing Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71 (1921)). 
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Circuit Judge Learned Hand, in a concurring opinion, expressed 
for the first time a rationale for the revenue rule that is cited by both 
domestic and foreign courts: 
Even in the case of ordinary municipal liabilities, a court will not 
recognize those arising in a foreign state, if they run counter to the 
“settled public policy” of its own.  Thus a scrutiny of the liability is 
necessarily always in reserve, and the possibility that it will be 
found not to accord with the policy of the domestic state.  This is 
not a troublesome or delicate inquiry when the question arises be-
tween private persons, but it takes on quite another face when it 
concerns the relations between the foreign state and its own citizens 
or even those who may be temporarily within its borders.  To pass 
upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at 
any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the re-
lations between the states themselves, with which courts are incom-
petent to deal, and which are [e]ntrusted to other authorities.  It 
may commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously 
embarrass its neighbor.  Revenue laws fall within the same reason-
ing; they affect a state in matters as vital to its existence as its 
criminal laws.  No court ought to undertake an inquiry which it 
cannot prosecute without determining whether those laws are con-
sonant with its own notions of what is proper.49 
The English cases and the early American cases that apply the reve-
nue rule do not offer a justification for ignoring the revenue laws of 
other jurisdictions beyond a desire not to interfere with commercial 
transactions and a reliance on the common law doctrine.  Judge Hand 
presented the first attempt to establish the rationale behind the doc-
trine.  First, Judge Hand noted the separation of powers problem in-
herent in the court’s examination of the revenue statute of a foreign 
state and asserted a court was not the proper government entity to 
review the statutes of a foreign state.50  Second, the court would have 
to reach a decision about the validity of the foreign law, and thus run 
the risk of declaring the revenue law of another state unenforceable 
within the jurisdiction of the court.  This would violate the concept of 
comity.  Although the decision in Moore did not survive the Supreme 
Court’s decision requiring states to extend full faith and credit to sis-
ter state tax judgments, Hand’s reasoning is often quoted by domestic 
and foreign courts to support application of the revenue rule in the 
international context.51 
 
 49. Moore, 30 F.2d at 604 (Hand, Cir. J., concurring). 
 50. The power to carry on foreign affairs is vested by the United States Constitution in the 
executive and legislative branches.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 51. See discussion infra Part II.C and Part III. 
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C. Full Faith and Credit: Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.52 
On certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court answered the question 
presented regarding whether tax judgments of sister states are enti-
tled to Full Faith and Credit,53 and whether recovery can be denied in 
state or federal courts “merely because it is for taxes.”54  Milwaukee 
County brought suit in federal district court in Illinois to recover un-
der a judgment against M. E. White Company for business license 
taxes assessed under Wisconsin law.55  The district court dismissed the 
cause of action on the ground that the suit was brought to enforce 
revenue laws of Wisconsin in the district court of Illinois.56  The deci-
sion, however, was narrowed to judgments for taxes: 
For present purposes, we will assume that the courts of one state 
are not required to entertain a suit to recover taxes levied under the 
statutes of another, and confine our inquiry to . . . whether they 
must, nevertheless, give full faith and credit to judgments for such 
taxes.57 
It is noteworthy that revenue statutes of sister states are not 
granted full faith and credit, but rather the decision is specifically ad-
dressed to judgments for taxes.  Judgments based on tax liabilities are 
not open to inquiry under this decision except on limited grounds: (1) 
the court issuing the judgment was without jurisdiction, (2) the judg-
ment debt was previously discharged, (3) the cause of action resulting 
in judgment for which the state of the forum has not provided a court, 
and (4) possibly fraud.58 
This abrogation of the revenue rule in the face of a judgment 
does not, however, apply to foreign judgments.  The purpose of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause was to change the status of states as 
completely independent actors and make the states “integral parts” of 
one nation.59  The Supreme Court’s abrogation of the revenue rule 
only after a judgment has been entered in the taxing state may be ex-
 
 52. 296 U.S. 268, 268 (1935). 
 53. U.S. CONST.  art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 54. M. E. White Co, 296 U.S. at 279. 
 55. Id. at 269-70. 
 56. Id. at 270. 
 57. Id. at 275. 
 58. Id. at 275-76 (listing cases with holdings that form exceptions to the rule that a state 
must recognize the judgment of a sister state). 
 59. Id. at 276-77. 
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plained by the principle of comity articulated by Judge Hand.60  If the 
taxing state has procured a judicial judgment, the taxpayer has re-
ceived due process and the enforcement of the judgment, as opposed 
to determining the tax that should be due under a sister state’s reve-
nue laws.  This removes the enforcing court from an obligation to re-
view the taxing state’s statute.  The enforcing court is not put in the 
position that concerned Judge Hand of having to sit in judgment of 
the wisdom or fairness of another state’s revenue laws.  Rather, the 
laws are presumed fair once a judgment has been entered by a court.  
In light of M.E. White Co., it is clear that state court judgments for 
taxes are enforceable in sister states, and the enforcement of mere 
levies or assessments rests in the state court’s discretion.61   
The Supreme Court only recently issued an opinion in a criminal 
case considering the revenue rule and remanded to the Second Cir-
cuit a case that required the application of the revenue rule in the 
context of a suit for taxes, directly or indirectly sought, by a foreign 
state.62  To assess the vitality of the revenue rule in the international 
sphere one must look first to lower court decisions in the United 
States and, by analogy, other common law jurisdictions to trace its 
evolution.  The Supreme Court considered these domestic and for-
eign decisions when it determined the applicability of the revenue 
rule to criminal prosecutions.63 
III.  REVENUE RULE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
A. Common Law Jurisdictions Outside North America 
British courts have dealt with the revenue rule in two distinct 
permutations: the enforcement of contracts when a revenue rule im-
 
 60. See Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 332-33, 338 (1843).  A New Hampshire court re-
quired the clerk of Chester, Vermont, to testify regarding the preparation of tax lists.  The court 
found the lists improperly prepared and entered a judgment for a tax refund to Henry.  This was 
a clear violation of the revenue rule’s purposes as articulated by Hand: the court undertook an 
analysis of a sister state’s taxing authority and taxing procedures and issued a judgment based 
on a finding of shortcomings therein.  Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Neely, 282 S.W.2d 150, 151-52 
(Ark. 1955); Detroit v. Gould, 146 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (Ill. 1957); Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 234 
S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1950); State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919, 
927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); State Tax Comm’n v. Cord, 404 P.2d 422, 425 (Nev. 1965); Buckley v. 
Huston, 291 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1972); Nelson v. Minn. Income Tax Div., 429 P.2d 324, 325 
(Wyo. 1967). 
 62. See Pasqunatino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1766 (2005); European Cmty. v. RJR 
Nabisco, 125 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2005). 
 63. Pasqunatino, 125 S.Ct. at 1175 and n.7. 
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pacts the legality of the undertaking, and actions that directly or indi-
rectly seek revenue for a foreign state.  The first set of cases falls un-
der the early decisions by Lord Hardwicke and Lord Mansfield that 
revenue laws are not considered by other states.  The British courts 
did not apply the revenue rule to salvage agreements to sell goods 
that were intended to be smuggled in contravention of the foreign 
state’s export restrictions or a ban on the goods intended for import.64  
Contracts would be found void as against public policy after the ar-
gument raising the revenue rule was discounted since the prohibition 
and export control laws at issue were not revenue laws.65  The U.S. 
ban on alcohol and Indian export law aimed at South Africa did not 
raise revenues for the legislating countries, and the ruling courts, as a 
matter of public policy, declined to enforce the contracts underlying 
illegal acts.  Additionally, the cases questioned whether the earlier 
decisions enforcing contracts despite their illegality under the non-
revenue laws of the nations where the transactions occurred—if tried 
currently—would not result in a different outcome in part because of 
changing public policy concerns.66  The dicta from the early cases has 
survived as a common law doctrine with far reaching ramifications 
and continued application by the British courts.  Yet, as discussed be-
low, the decisions rendered in the early cases establishing the rule 
have been undermined by the House of Lords. 
The British courts preserved the doctrine in the context of reve-
nue laws.  The British courts stand firmly behind Lord Mansfield’s 
statement that “no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of 
another.”67  An English court construed an action brought by the 
Municipal Council of Sydney for property assessments as an action 
“in the nature of an action for a penalty or to recover a tax; it is 
analogous to an action brought in one country to enforce the revenue 
 
 64. Foster v. Driscoll, [1929] 1 K.B. 470, 515 (A.C. 1928) (appeal taken from Eng.) (British 
citizens including a member of Parliament entered into a contract to purchase whiskey for im-
port into the United States during prohibition. The Court found the United States law was not a 
revenue law and the contract void as against public policy); Regazzoni v. Sethia, [1958] A.C. 
301, 302 (H.L. 1957) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Sethia agreed to sell Regazonni jute bags for 
import into South Africa in contravention of Indian export laws.  Sethia repudiated the contract 
and Sethia sued for enforcement.  The House of Lords found the contract unenforceable under 
Foster v. Driscoll). 
 65. See Foster, [1929] 1 K.B. at 515; Regazzoni, [1958] A.C. at 322. 
 66. See Regazzoni, [1958] A.C. at 320-22; Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 513-14 
(H.L. 1955); Foster, [1929] 1 K.B. at 515-16.  One of the early cases, for instance, involved smug-
gling gold from Portugal in violation of Portuguese export laws.  Boucher v. Lawson, (1734) 95 
Eng. Rep. 55, 55 (K.B.). 
 67. Holman, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1121. 
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laws of another,” despite the statute’s provision for a cause of action 
to pursue the claim under Australian law.68  The court noted that “it 
has always been held that an action will not lie outside the confines of 
the last-mentioned State,” and dismissed the appeal to be properly 
pursued in the courts of Australia.69  Courts extended the revenue 
rule to analogous laws that generated revenue for the foreign state. 
The King of Greece sued for funds held by a British bank to sat-
isfy payments due on currency exchanges; the court dismissed the suit 
because, “[i]t is perfectly elementary that a foreign government can-
not come here . . . and sue a person found in that jurisdiction for taxes 
levied.”70  When the Queen of Holland sought to collect succession 
duties through the English legal system, the court posited, “[t]he 
question is really, are the English Courts to be collectors of taxes for 
foreign governments?”71  The court answered the question by finding 
that Municipal Council of Sydney established the rule, and it was also 
a well recognized rule for over two hundred years that courts will not 
collect foreign taxes.72  Based on these precedents, the revenue rule 
squarely stands for the idea that courts will not act as collection agen-
cies for foreign governments seeking taxes assessed against citizens 
within the court’s jurisdiction.  These cases were decided with little 
discussion of the rationale behind the rule.  The House of Lords 
remedied this in a suit brought by the Indian government. 
In 1955, the Government of India sought income and capital gain 
taxes from a company that failed to pay its taxes upon liquidation.  
The House of Lords applied the revenue rule despite “remarkably lit-
tle authority upon the subject” and set forth three justifications for 
the rule.73  Lord Keith asserted that national sovereignty precluded 
the collection of taxes for another nation positing “that enforcement 
of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign power which 
imposed the taxes, and that an assertion of sovereign authority by one 
 
 68. Mun. Council of Sydney v. Bull, [1909] 1 K.B. 7, 12 (A.C. 1908) (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (A British resident owned property upon which improvements were made by the city, and 
a law was passed that assessed each property owner for a share of the cost of the improvements.  
The law allowed an action to be brought against the owner of the property for the cost.). 
 69. Id. at 12-13. 
 70. King of the Hellenes v. Brostrom, [1923] 16 Lloyd’s List L.R. 190, 193 (appeal taken 
from K.B.D.) (Eng.). 
 71. Queen of Holland v. Drukker, [1928] 1 Ch. 877, 879 (appeal taken from Eng.) (The 
Queen was a creditor of the estate on property transferred in England under the will of a Dutch 
citizen). 
 72. Id. at 883-84. 
 73. Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 504-14 (H.L. 1955). 
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State within the territory of another . . . [is] contrary to all concepts of 
independent sovereignties.”74  Based on Judge Hand’s opinion in 
Moore, Lord Keith considered that scrutiny of a foreign state’s reve-
nue law may offend the state and, therefore, should be avoided.75  
Lord Somervell offered a third justification based on administrative 
difficulties stating that “[i]f one considers the initial stages of the 
process, which may . . . be intricate and prolonged, it would be re-
markable comity if State B allowed the time of its courts to be ex-
pended in assisting in this regard the tax gatherers of State A.”76  
These justifications have been adopted to replace the blanket state-
ment made by Lord Mansfield as sufficient to restrain courts from ac-
cepting jurisdiction over cases brought by governments to collect tax 
liabilities arising in foreign states. 
An Irish court, a common law jurisdiction, and a British court 
have extended the doctrine to apply to the indirect collection of taxes 
for a governmental entity.  Whether the suit is initiated by the gov-
ernment as a cause of action for bankruptcy77 or a third party seeks to 
avoid payment on a contract because taxes will be assessed by a for-
eign government, courts in common law jurisdictions have relied on 
the revenue rule to decline jurisdiction over the bankruptcy and order 
payment on the contract.78  The justifications enunciated in Taylor 
 
 74. Id. at 511.  Extradition is available for taxpayers who commit criminal violation of 
revenue rules.  See Zagaris, infra note 196. 
 75. Id. at 511-12. 
 76. Id. at 514. 
 77. Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey, [1954] Ir. 89 (1951) (S.C.).  Bankruptcy proceedings 
were brought against a Scottish Company by the Scottish government.  The only debt was taxes 
that resulted from a retroactive 100% tax on excessive profits.  The owner of the company paid 
off the commercial debts of the company and moved to Ireland with the remaining funds with-
out paying the tax.  The Irish Court found the transfer of the assets fraudulent but were unwill-
ing to consider the retroactive revenue statute under the analysis of Judge Hand.  Id. at 105.  
The court further justified its adoption of the rule: 
Nor is modern history without examples of revenue laws used for purposes which 
would not only affront the strongest feelings of neighbouring communities but would 
run counter to their political aims and vital interests.  Such laws have been used for re-
ligious and racial discrimination; for the furtherance of social policies and ideals da n-
gerous to the security of adjacent countries; and for the direct furtherance of economic 
warfare.  So long as these possibilities exist, it would be equally unwise for Courts to 
permit the enforcement of the revenue claims of foreign States. 
Id. at 107 (Moore, J.). 
 78. In Rossano v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., (1963) 2 Q.B. 352 (Eng.), Rossano, an Egyptian busi-
nessman, took out endowment policies when war threatened Egypt in 1940. At the maturity of 
the policies he attempted to collect two policies in London as provided in the contracts. The in-
surance company refused payment because payment to Rossano was illegal under Egyptian law 
without permission of the Egyptian authorities and garnishee orders were served by Egyptian 
revenue authorities and were not satisfied.  The court held that there was no direct or indirect 
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support this comprehensive practice of declining to engage in an 
evaluation of the revenue laws of a foreign state or acting as a collec-
tion mechanism for foreign revenue agencies.  These justifications in-
clude: (1) comity precludes sitting in judgment of foreign states’ pub-
lic laws, (2) enforcement of taxes of another state is an extension of 
that state’s sovereignty, and (3) courts should avoid the administra-
tive difficulties of interpreting another state’s revenue laws.79  Cana-
dian and United States courts adopted this reasoning when assessing 
circumstances appropriate for the application of the revenue rule. 
B. Canada 
The Supreme Court of Canada applied the revenue rule in 
United States v. Harden.80  The United States sought enforcement of a 
tax judgment entered in federal district court in California against a 
United States citizen residing in British Columbia.81  The British Co-
lumbian court refused to enforce the judgment, relying on the three 
reasons articulated in Taylor to justify its decision.82  The Supreme 
Court upheld the lower court’s refusal of jurisdiction and dismissed 
the appeal.83 
In 1992, the Alberta Court of Appeal relied on Harden, Taylor, 
and Hand’s opinion in Moore to refuse indemnification of an execu-
tor of an United States’ estate for transfer taxes on property in Can-
ada.84  Despite criticism of Harden, Canada considers the enforce-
ment of tax judgments to be outside the jurisdiction of the judicial 
system.  The United States considered the Canadian interpretation of 
the revenue rule when it first faced the issue. 
C. United States 
As noted above, the only ruling related to the enforcement of 
foreign revenue laws in the United States was issued by a state court 
in 1806.85  The court adopted Lord Mansfield’s idea that a foreign 
 
enforcement of revenue laws of a foreign country, and the payments due under the policies were 
to be paid to Rossano in England.  Id. at 377. 
 79. Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 511-12 (H.L. 1955). 
 80. [1963] 41 D.L.R. 2d 721. 
 81. Id. at 722; but see supra  text accompanying notes 101-05 se tting forth treaty terms alter-
ing this outcome. 
 82. Id. at 724-26. 
 83. Id. at 727. 
 84. Stringham v. Dubois, [1992] 135 A.R. 64, 68-71 (Alta. Ct. App.). 
 85. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns 93, 94 (N.Y. 1806). 
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revenue law should not interfere with the enforcement of a commer-
cial contract.86  By the late twentieth century, it was clear that the law 
of the forum state controls a suit by a foreign state to collect a tax 
judgment.87  Additionally, domestic courts generally recognize foreign 
judgments when general principles of comity, as set forth in the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Hilton v. Guyot, are met.88  Yet, the en-
forcement of a judgment for tax liability was not addressed until the 
late twentieth century.89 
Canada sought enforcement of a certificate of assessment that 
had the same effect as the judgment of a court for taxes assessed 
against Oregon residents who engaged in logging in British Columbia 
and then failed to pay the logging tax on the income.90  The Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized that tax judgments were considered under the reve-
nue rule, and that recognition of a foreign judgment was based on re-
ciprocity with the claiming jurisdiction.91  Additionally, the Ninth 
Circuit reported that no other case of a foreign government seeking 
enforcement of a tax judgment had been presented to an American 
court, attributing this to the strength of the revenue rule.92  The court 
relied on Judge Hand’s discussion of the purpose of the revenue rule 
to find justification for not enforcing a foreign tax judgment.93  The 
court also examined a Supreme Court case declining to interfere with 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. See generally  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (deciding the law of 
the forum state governs an action in diversity); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 
487, 496 (1941) (applying conflicts of law rules of the forum state to actions in diversity). 
 88. Comity between nations would require a recognition of a foreign judgment: 
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court 
of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due 
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of juris-
prudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citi-
zens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show 
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or 
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any  other special reason why the comity of 
this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an 
action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial 
or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was errone-
ous in law or in fact. 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895).  The modern version of these requirements have 
been codified in the Uniform Foreign Monetary Judgments Act, see infra note 279. 
 89. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 90. Id. at 1162. 
 91. Id. at 1163-64.  The court found the lack of reciprocity sufficient to refuse to recognize 
British Columbia’s judgment.  See also discussion of Harden, supra  text accompanying notes 80-
83. 
 92. Id. at 1164. 
 93. Id. at 1164-65. 
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the application of a penal law by a foreign country and discussions by 
two Justices of the revenue rule in the same context.94  The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded: 
The revenue rule has been with us for centuries and as such has be-
come firmly embedded in the law.  There were sound reasons which 
supported its original adoption, and there remain sound reasons 
supporting its continued validity.  When and if the rule is changed, 
it is a more proper function of the policy-making branches of our 
government to make such a change.95 
It seems clear that to present a tax liability for collection it must be 
reduced to a judgment that would be recognized under state law.96  As 
noted by both Judge Hand and the Ninth Circuit, the decision to rec-
ognize tax judgments from foreign governments should rest with the 
legislature and/or the executive branch of government.97  Tax treaties 
are the proper mechanism for creating reciprocal recognition of 
judgments for tax liabilities.98  Bilateral agreements regarding recog-
nition of such judgments address the concerns raised by Hand in 
Moore and by Taylor .99  This solution has not, however, been widely 
adopted by the United States. 
IV.  TREATIES 
The revenue rule can be abrogated in an agreement between the 
United States and another country through a treaty.100  The United 
States has entered into income tax treaties with many countries pro-
viding for information exchange, but only five treaties provide for 
general assistance in collecting tax judgments against citizens of the 
contracting nations.101  Early treaties with Denmark, France, Sweden, 
 
 94. Id. at 1165 (citing the majority opinion and Justice White’s dissent regarding the reluc-
tance of courts to give effect to revenue laws of foreign countries.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-14, 448, 450 n.11 (1964)). 
 95. Id. at 1166. 
 96. This is true in the interstate context also, although some states have permitted actions 
for tax assessments without requiring that they be reduced to judgment.  See cases cited supra 
note 61. 
 97. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929); Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1166. 
 98. See e.g., Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 
115 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 99. Moore, 30 F.2d at 604; Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 511-12, 514 (H.L. 
1955). 
 100. See Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1165. 
 101. Canada, 268 F.3d at 115-16. 
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and the Netherlands provided for tax collection assistance.102  These 
treaties were ratified in the 1930s and 1940s, but by 1947 the Senate 
was not entirely pleased with collection efforts on behalf of the 
French government.103  Consequently, the terms of the treaty with 
France were amended in 1949 to limit enforcement requests to collect 
taxes owed to the requesting state only and not to allow the request-
ing state to pursue collection efforts against the citizens of the re-
quested state.104 
In 1951, the Senate declined to ratify provisions negotiated by 
the executive branch that provided for collection assistance in treaties 
with Greece, Norway, and South Africa.105  Subsequent agreements 
with Canada, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands have articles 
that provide: 
2. In the case of applications for enforcement of taxes, revenue 
claims of each of the States which have been fully determined may 
be accepted for enforcement by the other State and collected in 
that state in accordance with the laws applicable to the enforcement 
and collection of it own taxes.  The State to which application is 
 
 102. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Neth., art. 31,  Dec. 18, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 457 (1993) 
(entered into force Dec. 31, 1993); see also Protocol Amending the Convention With Respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital of September 26, 1980,  U.S.-Can., art. 15,  Mar. 17, 1995,  2030 
U.N.T.S. 236 (entered into force Nov. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Canada -U.S. 1995 Protocol]; Con-
vention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Re-
spect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Den., art. 27, Aug. 19, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-12 (entered 
into force Mar. 31, 2000): Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Preven-
tion of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Fr., art. 28,  Aug. 31, 
1994, 1963 U.N.T.S 67 (entered into force Dec. 30, 1995); Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-
Sweden, art. 27, Sept. 1, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-29 (entered into force Oct. 26, 1995). 
 103. Senator Smith , a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a floor 
statement in 1948 discussed the concern the Senate had with the treaty with France: 
[I]n 1947 attention was focused on the mutual collection assistance provisions of the 
treaty with France, and the Committee discovered that there had been developed  . . . a 
number of objections as to the way by which, under the convention, our country unde r-
took to collect taxes for the government of France.  This matter was of such concern 
that we held a number of hearings [and recommended consultation between individu-
als, businesses and interest groups concerned about the treaty and State Department 
representatives].  We discovered that there had been embodied in the convention cer-
tain methods of colle ction of taxes which we as a subcommittee felt were not desirable, 
and at our request the whole matter was reviewed again by the State Department re p-
resentatives. 
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 1 Legislative History of United States 
Tax Conventions 1152 (1962) (cited in Canada , 268 F.3d at 116). 
 104. Canada, 268 F.3d at 116 (citing Staff of the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 
1 Legislative History of United States Tax Conventions 1152 (1962); Supplementary Protocol to 
the Convention about Double Taxation and Fiscal Assistance, May 17, 1948).  
 105. Id. at 116-17 & n.13. 
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made shall not be required to enforce executory measures for 
which there is no provision in the law of the State making the appli-
cation. 
3. Any application shall be accompanied by documents establishing 
that under the laws of the State making the application the taxes 
have been finally determined. 
4. The assistance provided for in this Article shall not be accorded 
with respect to the citizens, corporations, or other entities of the 
State to which application is made, except in cases where the ex-
emption or reduced rate of tax granted under the Convention to 
such citizens, corporations or other entities has, according to mu-
tual agreement between the competent authorities of the State, 
been enjoyed by persons not entitled to such benefits.106 
This article limits the collection efforts undertaken by the parties to 
collect tax claims presented by the requesting country against its own 
citizens and does not provide a mechanism for collecting taxes owed 
to the foreign government by a citizen of the other State.  The appli-
cation of the treaty with Canada under this article was presented in a 
case brought by a Canadian citizen seeking to have a tax lien imposed 
by the Internal Revenue Service upon a request by the Canadian 
government set aside.107  The court reviewed the provisions of the 
treaty and refused to interfere with the tax lien as proper under the 
terms of the treaty.108  The treaty obligation created an exception to 
the revenue rule that the court properly recognized.  
The United States Model Income Tax Convention of September 
1996 contains no general provision for assistance in collection of for-
eign tax judgments or claims.109  Likewise, the United States has rati-
fied the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters only with 
a reservation to Article 27110 that provides for assistance in collecting 
 
 106. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Neth, supra  note 102 at 
art. XXX.  The language here is quoted from the treaty with the Netherlands; the wording of the 
other tre aties with Canada, Sweden, and Denmark varies slightly but the content is virtually 
identical. 
 107. Tesher v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 2d 297, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 108. Id. at 299-300. 
 109. Attorney  Gen. of Can v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 118 n.4 
(2d Cir. 2001).  
 110. Article 27, paragraph 3 provides: 
When a revenue claim of a Contracting State is enforceable under the laws of that 
State and is owed by a person, who at that time, cannot, under the laws of that State, 
prevent its collection, that revenue claim shall, at the request of the competent author-
ity of that State, be accepted for purposes of collection by that other State in accor-
dance with the prov isions of its laws applicable to the enforcement and colle ction of its 
own taxes as if the revenue claim were a revenue claim of that other State. 
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tax judgments and claims.111  The vitality of the revenue rule is dem-
onstrated by the reluctance of the Senate and the State Department 
to enter into agreements that abrogate the revenue rule and provide 
for collection of tax claims except under limited circumstances and 
not against citizens of the United States with tax liabilities in arrears 
to foreign countries.  The mechanism for so doing is available as 
demonstrated in the early twentieth century treaties with France, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands, and as demonstrated in the OECD 
Convention on Mutual Assistance; but it is clear that the legislative 
and executive branches of the government are presently unwilling to 
enter into broad enforcement agreements. 
The judiciary, limited by the revenue rule, cannot sua sponte en-
gage in the recognition of foreign tax claims.  The reluctance of the 
executive and legislative branches may represent an underutilization 
of treaties to facilitate the collection of United States taxes from per-
sons who are citizens of the United States, or a fear that the provision 
would be used primarily against United States residents.  But the pre-
sent treaty protocol of the United States disallows the collection of 
foreign tax debts or foreign tax judgments against United States citi-
zens.  The reverse is also true as to the United States’ ability to collect 
taxes through foreign court systems.  This reluctance may be due, in 
part, to the reasons that support the revenue rule: a reluctance to ac-
cept foreign revenue laws as in keeping with the United States public 
policy stance and a desire to avoid an evaluation of a foreign revenue 
law that risks offending the foreign state.  The inclusion of collection 
procedures for foreign taxes also presents the problem that the laws 
in place when the treaty was signed may change and public policy is-
sues may again assert themselves after the ratification of the treaty.  It 
is clear that the executive and legislative branches working together 
could abrogate the revenue rule through treaties yet they are unwill-
ing to do so.  
V.  CURRENT CASES 
By the end of the twentieth century, it became clear that courts 
in the United States recognize the revenue rule as a common law doc-
trine that permits courts to decline jurisdiction over attempts by a 
foreign sovereign to collect tax debts without a specific agreement be-
tween governments.  This settled doctrine reasserted itself in the last 
 
Phillip Burgess, Globilization Comes to Tax Collection, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L, 645,  650 (2004). 
 111. Id.; Canada, 268 F.3d at 118. 
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decade of the twentieth century as a defense to suits brought against 
persons involved in illegal activities.  The high taxes imposed on ciga-
rettes and alcohol create a temptation to the dishonest to circumvent 
the duties and pocket what would otherwise be revenue to a foreign 
government.  Federal statutory provisions allow at least two avenues 
of attack against smuggling operations engaged in by United States 
citizens.  If the parties communicate over interstate wires, they can be 
prosecuted in federal court for violation of the wire fraud statute.112  
Or the parties injured can pursue relief under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) statute.113  Defendants 
in both criminal and civil suits have invoked the revenue rule as a bar 
to the judicial proceedings.  The Supreme Court issued an opinion 
that considered the scope of the revenue rule in a criminal case and, 
upon a petition for certiorari, remanded one of the RICO suits to the 
Second Circuit for reconsideration.114 
A. RICO Cases 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. (Reynolds), in response to 
the Canadian government’s doubling of the tobacco tax, engaged in 
elaborate schemes that involved exporting Canadian cig arettes and 
tobacco under false declarations, manufacturing the tobacco into Ca-
nadian cigarettes in Puerto Rico and then smuggling the cigarettes 
through free-trade zones or Indian reservations back into Canada.115  
Canada brought an action in a United States court under the U.S. 
civil RICO statutes116 seeking damages from Reynolds based on lost 
 
 112.  
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire  . . . . com-
munication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or 
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this ti-
tle or imprisoned . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000). 
 113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000).  
 114. Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1766, 1766 (2005); European Cmty v. RJR Na-
bisco, 125 S.Ct. 1968, 1968 (2005). 
 115. Canada, 268 F.3d at 106-07.  R.J. Reynolds’ Canadian distribution subsidiary and sev-
eral individuals pled guilty to mail and wire fraud relating to the smuggling activities that are the 
subject of Canada’s RICO suit. 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).  Section 1962 provides, in pertinent part: 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 
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tax revenues and additional law enforcement costs.117  The Second 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim, as 
a suit based on the avoidance of foreign taxes was precluded under 
the revenue rule.118  The Second Circuit first determined the validity 
of the revenue rule and then acknowledged the rationales advanced 
in federal and foreign cases prevented Canada from utilizing the 
RICO statutes to recover its revenue losses or the cost of enforcing its 
revenue laws in United States courts.119  A “long standing common 
law doctrine prov iding that courts of one sovereign will not enforce 
final tax judgments or unadjudicated claims of other sovereigns” sup-
ported a finding of validity.120  Despite the lack of a Supreme Court 
case addressing the revenue rule in the international context, the 
court found that the Supreme Court had acknowledged the continu-
ing validity of the doctrine in a number of decisions cited by the 
court.121  International acceptance of the revenue rule included Can-
ada, as made evident in the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in 
Harden, where the rule was invoked to prevent the enforcement of a 
United States judgment for taxes.122 
The court adopted the three grounds for adhering to the revenue 
rule articulated in Taylor .  First, the “rule prevents foreign sovereigns 
from asserting their sovereignty within the borders of other na-
tions.”123  As Judge Hand explained in Moore, the concept of comity 
prevents courts from reviewing the public policy underlying a nation’s 
choice of revenue law.124  The court noted that addressing such public 
policy concerns “could embroil United States courts in delicate issues 
 
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct 
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through 
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.  Id. 
 117. Canada, 268 F.3d at 105-06. 
 118. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 
144 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 119. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 109 (2d 
Cir. 2001).  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (citing, inter alia, Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 740 n.3 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-14 (1964)). 
 122. Canada, 268 F.3d at 111 n.5 (citing Harden, [1963] S.C.R. at 371). 
 123. Id. at 111-12 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 448 (White, J., dissenting on other 
grounds)). 
 124. Id. at 112 (citing, inter alia, Moore, 30 F.2d at 604 (L. Hand, J., concurring). 
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in which they have little expertise or capacity.”125  Without any discus-
sion, the court noted that past rulings suggested that an analysis of 
foreign revenue laws was difficult, a ground for the rule advanced in 
Taylor.126 
Having recognized the rule, the court acknowledged that gov-
ernments could arrange to aid each other in the collection of tax 
debts; but, under the concept of separation of powers, this needed to 
be accomplished by the executive and legislative branches: 
[E]xtraterritorial tax enforcement directly implicates relations be-
tween our country and other sovereign nations.  When a foreign na-
tion appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its 
revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and dis-
putes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to - and better 
handled by—the political branches of government.127 
The court recognized the restriction in the Canadian-U.S. 1995 Proto-
col as only limiting requests for “finally determined” revenue claims 
against the requesting country’s citizens.128  The court properly noted 
two impediments under the treaty to judicial enforcement of the tax 
liability: (1) the treaty barred collection of Canadian tax from a 
United States citizen or corporation; and (2) the taxes sought were 
not finally determined under a judicial procedure within Canada.129  
Despite the fact that Canada was not asking for direct enforcement of 
a tax liability, it is clear that the revenue rule precludes indirect ef-
forts to collect a tax.130  The court concluded by expressing its regret 
that it was unable to right an alleged wrong but found itself “without 
license to abandon unilaterally the centuries-old, albeit sharply at-
tacked, revenue rule.”131 
Judge Calabresi attacked the decision and the revenue rule in his 
dissent and opined that the RICO statutes allowed suits based on lost 
tax revenue because the damages were based on a United States stat-
ute and not on Canadian revenue laws.132  Calabresi examined the jus-
tifications presented by the majority for the revenue rule and found 
 
 125. Id. at 113 (finding the tobacco tax based on Canada’s public health concerns and at 
least arguably contrary to the interests of some United States citizens and raising other hypo-
thetical examples where foreign public policy would diverge from American interests). 
 126. Id. at 112; see Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 514 (H.L. 1955). 
 127. Canada, 268 F.3d at 113-14. 
 128. Canada-U.S. 1995 Protocol, supra note 102, art. 15, ¶ 8, 2. 
 129. Canada, 268 F.3d at 120-21. 
 130. Id. at 130-31. 
 131. Id. at 134. 
 132. Id. at 135 (Calabresi, J. dissenting). 
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them not applicable to Canada’s use of the RICO statutes.  Sover-
eignty, according to Judge Calabesi, is not and cannot be implicated 
by a suit brought under a U.S. statute.133  The dissent also asserted 
that separation of powers is not violated if a suit is brought under leg-
islation enacted by the United States Congress and signed into law by 
the President.134  Calabresi noted, with approval, the use of foreign 
revenue laws to determine the extent of damages and recognized it as 
the strongest argument against entertaining the suit.135  Nevertheless, 
Calabresi found that this obstacle was overcome by the Second Cir-
cuit’s rejection of the argument in the context of criminal prosecu-
tions under the wire fraud statute.136  Calabresi concluded that he 
cannot “join an opinion that applies an old and dubious common law 
rule, in ways that have nothing to do with its roots or rationales, in 
order to limit an Act of Congress that the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly applied in the broadest possible ways.”137 
Although Judge Calabresi makes valid arguments regarding the 
scope of the RICO statutes and the reduced perception of an exten-
sion of sovereignty by a foreign government into United States courts 
when a statute passed by the legislature and signed by the executive 
invites suit by those injured by a conspiracy, the majority has the bet-
ter position.  Despite the breadth of the RICO statutes, they do not 
address the direct or indirect collection of foreign taxes, although the 
revenue rule existed at the time the statutes were enacted.  Collection 
of foreign taxes under the RICO statutes presents the same problems 
that direct suit for enforcement of a judgment presents: The court is 
faced with deciding whether a foreign revenue law should be upheld 
in a domestic court without significant input from the other branches 
of the government, and the court is placed in the position of having to 
decipher foreign revenue laws and risk offending foreign states.  
Without clear intent in the RICO statutes that the legislature and ex-
 
 133. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 136 (2d 
Cir. 2001).  
 134. See id. at 136-37 (noting that the court s are merely implementing foreign policy as de-
cided by the other branches). 
 135. Id. at 137. 
 136. Id. at 137-38.  See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 549 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding a 
scheme nearly identical to the present acts to defraud the Canadian government of tax revenue 
cognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000), the wire fraud statute, because success was not re-
quired for prosecution); United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 165 (2d. Cir. 2000) (finding the 
same, but court held prosecution must prove a property right—the right to revenue—of which 
Canada could be defrauded). 
 137. Canada, 268 F.3d at 140. 
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ecutive branches intended courts to undertake such analysis and deci-
sion-making tasks, the revenue rule stands to protect the courts from 
those undertakings.  The RICO statutes, as concluded by the major-
ity, run afoul of the separation of powers and comity concerns of the 
revenue rule.138  To a lesser extent, the difficulty of interpreting for-
eign revenue laws was also presented, but the panel as a whole was 
less concerned with this aspect. 
Canada was not the only victim of the tobacco companies’ smug-
gling schemes, and other governments brought RICO suits seeking 
redress for their lost taxes.  The Republics of Ecuador, Belize, and 
Honduras made allegations of wide-spread smuggling operations and 
brought suit against Philip Morris in the Eleventh Circuit, which 
adopted the revenue rule as the law of that circuit and found that, in 
civil RICO and state common law actions, abstention was required.139  
The European Community and the Republic of Columbia initially 
won a motion to dismiss based on a defense of the revenue rule in a 
civil RICO action against Philip Morris, RJR Nabisco, Inc. and Japan 
Tobacco, Inc. in the Eastern District of New York.140  The court’s rul-
ing that “the revenue rule is not implicated in this case,” was made 
without benefit of the Second Circuit’s ruling in Canada, and the dis-
trict court found the revenue rule applicable under the earlier Second 
Circuit decision to disregard the revenue rule in federal wire fraud 
and mail fraud prosecutions.141  A renewed motion to dismiss was 
granted when the district court acquiesced, as it must, to the Second 
Circuit’s ruling in Canada.142  On appeal,143 the European Community 
asserted that Congress abrogated the revenue rule as applied to the 
RICO statutes when the PATRIOT Act144 was enacted.145  The Sec-
ond Circuit found no clear intent by Congress to abrogate the reve-
 
 138. Id. at 126, 134–35. 
 139. Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 341 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 140. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).  
 141. Id. at 471. 
 142. European Cmty. v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 143. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2004), cert pending .  
Judge Calabresi was assigned to the panel hearing this case and, although he continued in his 
belief that Canada was not correctly decided, he recognized that he was bound by the precedent 
established in that case.  Id. at 132; n.4. 
 144. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272. 
 145. European Cmty., 355 F.3d at 127. 
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nue rule and, upon the reasoning set forth in Canada, the district 
court’s decision was affirmed.146 
A petition for certiorari was recently filed in the United States 
Supreme Court presenting the question of the applicability of the 
revenue rule to “claims brought under U. S. domestic law seeking eq-
uitable relief to enjoin and remedy smuggling schemes based in the 
United States.”147  The petition asserts that the Second Circuit breaks 
new ground by applying the revenue rule to a suit that does not di-
rectly seek taxes but instead seeks injunctive and equitable relief, and 
that the revenue rule is not applicable to suits bought under U.S. do-
mestic law.148  Since courts, including the Second Circuit, apply the 
revenue rule to attempts to collect taxes both directly and indirectly, 
the argument that the Second Circuit’s ruling denied the Plaintiffs 
equitable relief does not appear to raise a serious challenge to the 
dismissal of the European Community’s and the Republic of Colum-
bia’s claims.  But, as requested in their petition for certiorari, the Su-
preme Court awaited its decision in the federal wire fraud cases be-
fore deciding whether to hear argument in the RICO cases.149 
B. Wire Fraud Cases 
A conviction for wire fraud requires proof of a scheme to de-
fraud and use of wire communication to further that scheme.150 Wire 
fraud violations are limited to schemes that attempt to deprive an-
other of money or property.151  In 1994, federal prosecutors in Maine 
indicted Native Americans who used Indian reservations as staging 
grounds for liquor smuggling activities into Canada, thereby depriv-
ing Canada of excise and sales tax.152 In United States v. Boots, the 
First Circuit reversed the convictions for wire fraud imposed by the 
 
 146. Id. at 132-35. 
 147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 
1968 (2005) (No. 03–1427). The petition suggested that the petition be held for the outcome in, 
United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) cert. granted, 124 St. Ct. 
1875 (2004), a federal wire fraud case.  Id. at 27.  The Fourth Circuit overturned a panel decision 
in an en banc rehearing to find the revenue not implicated and the Supreme Court affirmed.  
See infra  discussion part V(B). 
 148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 
1968 (2005) (No. 03–1427). 
 149. Id. at 8; European Cmty., 125 S.Ct. at 1968. 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000); United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 407 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 151. McNally v. United States, 482 U.S. 350, 356 (1987).  
 152. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 583-84 (1st Cir. 1996). 
03_MALLINAK.DOC  3/1/2006   12:51 PM 
104 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE &  INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol 16:79 
district court.153  The court, in finding the revenue rule applicable, dis-
cerned that the conviction did not enforce the revenue laws of Can-
ada, but “upholding defendants’ section 1343 conviction would 
amount functionally to penal enforcement of Canadian customs and 
tax laws.”154  The court looked at two justifications for the revenue 
rule: comity and separation of powers.  The court held that in order to 
uphold the convictions it would have to consider challenges made by 
the defendants to Canadian law and determine if such laws were 
valid, and then determine how the statutes operated in the case be-
fore it, a violation of the revenue rule’s rationale against interfering 
with the public laws of a foreign state, or comity.155  As to separation 
of powers, the court noted that the federal smuggling statutes punish 
“such activities only if the foreign government has a reciprocal law.” 
156  The participation of the executive branch in bringing the prosecu-
tion was insufficient to satisfy the separation of powers concern and a 
decision as to whether conduct is criminal (because it is aimed at a 
particular country) cannot be left solely to prosecutorial discretion.157  
The First Circuit found no proof of a scheme to defraud another of 
money or property was possible in a scheme to evade excise and sales 
taxes when the revenue rule excluded consideration of the revenue 
laws of a foreign country.158  Later courts find this to be a misapplica-
tion of the revenue rule and come to different results.159 
At the same time as Boots was wending its way through the First 
Circuit, federal prosecutors indicted Trapilo and others under the 
federal wire fraud statute for smuggling alcohol and cigarettes 
through a Mohawk reservation in upstate New York.160  The district 
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment in re-
liance on Boots, and the Second Circuit reversed and remanded.161  
The Second Circuit briefly considered the revenue rule and noted 
that its purpose was to maintain the separation of powers between the 
branches of government and international relations properly be-
 
 153. Id. at 595. 
 154. Id. at 587. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 588 ; see 18 U.S.C. § 546. 
 157. Boots, 80 F.3d at 588. 
 158. Id. at 587. 
 159. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 547; United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir. 
2003) (en banc), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004). 
 160. Id. at 549. 
 161. Id. at 553. 
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longed to the executive and legislative branches.162  The court decided 
the common law revenue rule was not properly implicated by the wire 
fraud statute because “at the heart of the indictment is the misuse of 
the wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the Canadian gov-
ernment of tax revenue, not the validity of a foreign sovereign’s reve-
nue laws,” and “identity and location of the victim and the success of 
the scheme is irrelevant.”163  Upon a scanty review of the rule, the 
court found that the federal statute proscribed criminal activity within 
the United States, and the fact that the fraud was aimed at a foreign 
government’s revenue laws did not negate the fraudulent act within 
the United States.164 
A third wire fraud persecution addressed the circuit split be-
tween the First and Second Circuits.  The First Circuit decision, im-
plicating the revenue rule and reversing wire fraud convictions when 
the purpose of the fraud was to evade Canadian taxes on liquor, was 
disregarded in the Second Circuit’s holding that the federal wire fraud 
statute is complete unto itself without consideration of foreign reve-
nue statutes.  This dichotomy was present in a wire fraud case 
brought in Maryland.165  The United States indicted David and Carl 
Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts for the use of interstate wires to facili-
tate an alcohol smuggling scheme originating in Maryland.166  The de-
fendants profited from the illegal transportation of alcohol into Can-
ada and the sale of that liquor on black markets without payment of 
the Canadian excise and sales tax.167  The defendants were convicted 
at trial of wire fraud in a scheme not unlike those tried in the First 
and Second Circuits.168 
The district court denied a motion to dismiss under the reasoning 
of Boots, but the appellate court reversed those convictions agreeing 
with the First Circuit that, under the revenue rule, upholding the con-
victions “would amount functionally to penal enforcement of Cana-
dian customs and tax laws.”169  The majority members of the panel 
 
 162. Id. at 552-53. 
 163. Id. at 552. 
 164. See id. at 552-53. 
 165. United States v. Pasquantino, 305 F.3d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 324-25. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Pasquantino, 305 F.3d at 296 (quoting Boots, 80 F.3d at 587).  It is notable that Judge 
Gregory wrote the decision to which E.D.Va. Judge Lee, sitting by designation joined, but Se n-
ior Judge Hamilton, the author of the en banc opinion affirming the convictions, dissented.  Id. 
at 292, 299. 
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based their application of the revenue rule on Hand’s rationale of 
comity, which states that United States courts should not be required 
to review foreign revenue statutes and, additionally, the courts should 
avoid the interpretation and application of foreign laws.170  In the dis-
sent, Judge Hamilton took the view of the Second Circuit that the 
revenue rule is not implicated in the prosecution by the United States 
of fraud within the United States when the purpose of the fraud is to 
defraud another state of property, and it is incidental that the prop-
erty is tax revenues.171 
The court granted an en banc rehearing of the decision, and Sen-
ior Judge Hamilton wrote the majority decision affirming the convic-
tions.172  The court framed the issue as whether “application of the 
common law revenue rule precludes prosecution under the federal 
wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, for use of interstate wires for the 
purpose of executing a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of its 
property rights in accrued tax revenue.”173  The court first relied on 
section 483 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law for 
a definition of the revenue rule: “Courts in the United States are not 
required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of 
taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.”174  
The court reviewed the decisions in Boots, Canada , and Gilbertson 
and found common rationales for the revenue rule.175  First, comity 
suggested that courts should not subject foreign public laws to judicial 
scrutiny, as sovereignty protects the court of one nation from the ob-
ligation to further the national interests of another nation, and the 
doctrine of separation of powers requires the judicial branch to not 
interfere in matters of foreign policy.176 
The reading of the revenue rule presented by the defense was 
broader and based on the early English cases, Holman v. Johnson and 
 
 170. Id. at 297-98. 
 171. Id. at 299-300 (Hamilton, S. Cir. J., dissenting).  
 172. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 324. 
 173. Id. 
 174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW of the UNITED STATES § 483 
(1987).  This definition seems rather limited as it is addressed solely at judgments and does not 
contemplate matters in which the revenue laws of another country are implicated, a central part 
of the courts’ historical decisions where the issue of whether the revenue laws of a foreign state 
should influence the jurisdiction or decision of the court. 
 175. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 327 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted, 
124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004). 
 176. Id. 
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Planche v. Fletcher.177  The defense reading required that no court 
ever recognize a revenue law of another state.178  The court easily dis-
posed of this characterization: the early statements were dicta—in 
Holman, the statement was made in a discussion of the choice of law 
issue and in Planche , the issue was fraud in England, not whether the 
consideration of French import taxes was required.179  The court in-
stead looked to the formulation of the revenue rule in 1952, when the 
wire fraud statute was enacted.180  The court characterized the rule as 
permissive and not mandatory, and the force of the rule was ad-
dressed at foreign tax judgments, not to the non-recognition of for-
eign revenue laws.181  Under this reading, foreign revenue laws are 
not subject to the Restatement, just judgments based on foreign tax 
judgments.182  The court concluded that the First Circuit erred in 
Boots, and wire fraud prosecutions do nothing to enforce tax judg-
ments or revenue laws of the victim state and, as a result of this char-
acterization of the revenue rule and the criminal charge, the revenue 
rule is inapplicable in a wire fraud prosecution.183 
The court next considered the rationale often offered that the 
revenue rule protects the doctrine of separation of powers.  The dis-
inclination of courts to usurp the power of the executive and legisla-
tive branches by engaging in foreign policy was not implicated be-
cause Congress enacted the wire fraud statute that encompassed 
fraud in foreign commerce against money or property, and the execu-
tive branch participated in the prosecution by indicting the defen-
dants and prosecuting the suit.184  The doctrine of separation of pow-
ers was respected in the wire fraud prosecution, according to the 
court, by this degree of participation by the other branches of the 
government.185  The majority of the en banc court affirmed the con-
victions on rehearing. 
 
 177. Id. at 327-29. 
 178. Id. at 328. 
 179. Id. at 329. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 329. 
 182. Id. at 330 n.3. 
 183. Id. at 331. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  Whether Congress contemplated use of the wire fraud statute to allow foreign gov-
ernments to seek damages based on lost revenues is part of the question before the Supreme 
Court. 
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Judge Gregory, who wrote for the majority in the underlying 
opinion, dissented in an opinion joined by Judge Michael.186  First, 
Judge Gregory pointed out that the First Circuit and the Second Cir-
cuit are diametrically opposed in their application of the Restate-
ment’s definition of the revenue rule.187  To overcome this difference 
in interpretation, Judge Gregory accepted Lord Mansfield’s state-
ments as persuasive evidence of the breadth of the revenue rule.188  
The dissent concluded that, because a violation of the wire fraud stat-
ute requires proof of a scheme to deprive another of property, and 
the property that satisfied the statute was the Canadian tax on the 
smuggled liquor, proof relating to Canadian revenue laws was re-
quired.189  The court would then be in the position of analyzing the 
revenue laws of a foreign state, exactly what the revenue rule seeks to 
prevent.190 
A petition for certiorari was granted, and the United States So-
licitor General framed the question as “[w]hether the wire fraud stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, prohibits schemes to use the interstate wires in 
the United States to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue.”191  
The Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the Fourth Circuit 
and upholding the convictions.192 
The Petitioners argued that the only harm presented by the 
smuggling scheme was the loss of Canadian tax revenues, and there 
was no harm in the United States.193  In support of the claim that no 
prosecution was proper in the United States, the Petitioners argued 
that (1) the smuggling statute required reciprocity that is not present 
in this case;194 (2) the Canada-United States Treaty provides for assis-
tance only upon presentation of a judgment and never against United 
 
 186. Id. at 338, 343 (Gregory, Cir. J. dissenting). 
 187. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 339 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted, 
124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004). (Gregory, Cir. J. dissenting).  
 188. Id. at 340 (Gregory, Cir. J. dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 341 (Gregory, Cir. J. dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 341-42.  The dissent also noted that the sentencing guidelines calculated sentences 
for a wire fraud conviction based on the amount of loss suffered by the victims, a calculation 
that requires computation of the tax due to the Canadian governmental entities. Id. at 342-43 
(Gregory, J. dissenting). 
 191. Brief for the United States in Opposition at I, Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 
1766 (2005) (No. 03-725). 
 192. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1781. 
 193. Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005) (No. 
03-725). 
 194. Id. at 29, 45-46. 
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States citizens;195 (3) extradition is a more appropriate measure to col-
lect foreign taxes;196 and (4) the revenue rule is violated by the wire 
fraud prosecution.197  In support of these arguments, Petitioners 
averred the revenue rule’s concern with separation of powers is vio-
lated because the wire fraud statute as a mechanism for enforcing for-
eign revenue laws is a radical revision of international relations in a 
way not considered by Congress.198  Additionally, Petitioners asserted 
that comity is violated when the courts determine foreign tax liability, 
as they must when a wire fraud case is based on the avoidance of for-
eign taxes.199  Finally, convictions based on common law fraud could 
not be supported by failure to pay taxes to a foreign sovereign and 
failure to declare goods imported into a foreign country.200  As re-
ported in the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision, Petitioners rely on an 
overbroad reading of the revenue rule to foreclose any suit in United 
States courts that intersects, no matter how slightly, with a foreign 
revenue law and does not adequately address the modern version of 
the rule201 as a total defense from prosecution. 
The Government responded that the wire fraud statute prohibits 
any scheme executed through interstate wires that has as its purpose 
to defraud another, and that Congress did not provide exceptions.202  
The domestic criminal prosecution, according to the Government, 
does not seek to enforce foreign revenue law or a claim to foreign tax 
revenue.203  The Government avers that proof of the existence of for-
eign revenue laws does not violate the revenue rule as it does not en-
 
 195. Id. at 47-49. 
 196. Id. at 46-47 and n.52; see Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Efforts to Extradite Persons for Tax Of-
fenses, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 653, 682-83 (2002) (summarizing the U.S.-Canada 
Extradition Treaty terms regarding tax offenses). 
 197. Brief for the Petitioners, supra  note 193, at 9-27. 
 198. Id. at 34. 
 199. Id. at 38-40. 
 200. Id. at 33-36. 
 201. See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161,  179 
(Winter 2002). 
The revenue rule underwent a metamorphosis in the twentieth century.  It changed 
from a rule for sustaining the validity of contracts that violate foreign law into a rule 
that bars foreign governments from collecting their taxes.  Its original rationale of 
promoting trade was abandoned.  Instead, we find today essentially three justifications 
for the revenue rule: (1) that enforcing foreign law is burdensome; (2) that scrutiny of 
foreign law might cause offense to foreign nations; and (3) that foreign law is a viola-
tion of the forum’s sovereignty. 
 202. Brief for the United States at 6, Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2 005) 
(No. 03-725). 
 203. Id. at 11-17. 
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tail enforcement directly or indirectly of a foreign public law.204  Sepa-
ration of powers is maintained because the executive acts through the 
prosecutor and sovereignty is respected as there is no assertion by 
Canada of authority in the United States courts.205  The Government 
asserted that the court would not have administrative problems with 
determining the magnitude of the loss since courts are generally adept 
at determining laws of other jurisdictions.206  As to the revenue rule’s 
concern for comity, the Government pointed out that, since the 
prosecutor determines which cases to bring, the courts are relieved of 
determining the merits of the foreign taxing system and, if the deci-
sion to prosecute is unclear, the Department of Justice can confer 
with the Department of State.207  This argument was the Govern-
ment’s weakest since courts are generally reluctant to assume the 
Government’s assessment of the law is accurate without an independ-
ent inspection of the underlying statutes or common law rule, 
whether the  implicated law is domestic or foreign.208 
The Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s en banc  decision, affirming Defendant’s convictions for wire 
fraud.209  Justice Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion, framed the 
issue as whether “a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax reve-
nue violates the federal wire fraud statute.”210  Justice Thomas an-
swered that query in the affirmative stating: “the plain terms of § 1343 
criminalize such a scheme, and because this construction of the wire 
fraud statute does not derogate from the common-law revenue rule, 
we hold that it does.”211  To determine if the wire fraud statute dero-
gates from the revenue rule, the Court looked to the state of the 
revenue rule in 1952 when the wire fraud statute was enacted to see if 
the revenue rule clearly barred such a prosecution.212  Justice Thomas 
 
 204. Id. at 16-22. 
 205. Id. at 22-24. 
 206. Id. at 25-27. 
 207. Id. at 23-24. 
 208. Petitioner’s reply brief reiterated the scope of the revenue rule as quite broad and the 
wire fraud statute as narrow and then attacked the gov ernment’s expansive view of executive 
branch powers as insufficient to eliminate the significant separation of powers cha llenge to the 
court’s power to decide a case resting on the violation of foreign state’s revenue law without 
participation from Congress.  Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 8, Pasquantino v. United States, 
125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005) (No. 03-725). 
 209. Pasqunatino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1781 (2005). 
 210. Id. at 1770. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1774.  The Court initially considered whether petitioner’s satisfied the elements 
of the crime of wire fraud.  The two elements challenged: (1) whether they engaged in a scheme 
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described the revenue rule, saying that, “at its core, it prohibited the 
collection of tax obligations of foreign nations.”213 
The Court considered the rulings in Colorado v. Harbeck, Mary-
land v. Turner, and Moore v. Mitchell, in noting that the revenue rule 
prohibited “the enforcement of tax liabilities of one sovereign in the 
courts of another sovereign.” 214  Additionally, the Court considered 
the decisions by other common law jurisdictions.215  The Court found 
these cases different from the present prosecution because the prose-
cution was not a suit to recover a tax liability for a foreign govern-
ment but a suit brought by the United States to punish criminal con-
duct in the United States.216 
The Court next considered the petitioner’s argument that the 
revenue rule applied to indirect actions for foreign taxes.217  After 
considering the opinions issued in Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey by 
the Irish court and the decision issued by the House of Lords in Gov-
ernment of India v. Taylor, the Court found that these cases, and the 
other cases cited by the petitioners, did not “involve a domestic sov-
ereign acting pursuant to authority conferred by a criminal statute.”218  
The Court concluded that, although the revenue rule was extended by 
courts in the twentieth century beyond its core prohibition against en-
forcement of foreign tax liabilities, it could not say with “any reason-
able certainty whether Congress in 1952 would have considered this 
prosecution within the revenue rule.”219  The Court gave scant con-
sideration to Petitioner’s argument that the eighteenth century Eng-
 
or artifice to defraud and (2) whether the object of the fraud was property in the victim’s hands, 
were found by the Court to be satisfied by the smuggling operation undertaken by the petition-
ers.  Id. at 1771-73. 
 213. Id. at 1775. 
 214. Id. at 1775 and n.7. 
 215. Pasqunatino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1775 and n.8 (2005) (citing to Her Maj-
esty the Queen v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 1979) and Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. 
McVey, [1955] Ir. 89 (S.C. 1951)). 
 216. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1775. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 1776. 
 219. Id. at 1777.  The Court also considered petitioner’s argument that the Mandatory Vic-
tims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2004), that required restitution to 
the victim, Canada, made the collection of taxes the object of the suit.  The Court quickly dis-
missed this argument because the suit advanced the Government’s interest in punishing internal 
criminal behavior and the award of restitution was to “mete out appropriate criminal punish-
ment for that conduct.”  The Court ruled that, if awarding rest itution were found to be contrary 
to the revenue rule, the appropriate course would be to construe the restitution statute to not 
allow such payments rather than assuming that the enactment of the restitution law repealed the 
wire fraud statute as to fraud against foreign governments.  Id. 
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lish cases, Boucher v. Lawson and Planche v. Fletcher, stood for the 
proposition that indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws is at the 
heart of the revenue rule by recognizing that the revenue rule devel-
oped into a “very different” doctrine by the twentieth century.220 
Next the Court evaluated whether the rationales advanced for 
the revenue rule in the twentieth century by Hand and the House of 
Lords are violated by the prosecution of the smugglers under the wire 
fraud statute.221  First, the Court considered whether the prosecution 
posed a risk of requiring the court to evaluate the statutes of a foreign 
sovereign.222  The Court perceived little risk of international friction 
since the executive branch of the government, the branch responsible 
for foreign relations, brought the suit and presumably evaluated the 
impact such action brought to bear on relations with Canada.  The 
fact that the prosecution required a court to recognize a foreign reve-
nue law to determine if there was a violation of domestic law did not 
violate the revenue rule.223  Second, the Court considered whether the 
prosecution furthered the governmental interests of a foreign state 
but held that prosecution under the wire fraud statute was authorized 
by the Congress and the Executive “irrespective of the object of the 
fraud,” and there was no risk of advancing Canada’s policies illegiti-
mately.224  Finally, the Court found the court competent to interpret 
foreign statutes under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 26.1 and 
noted that a prosecution witness provided uncontroverted testimony 
regarding the Canadian taxes the petitioners sought to avoid.225  The 
opinion concluded by remarking that, “[i]t may seem odd use of the 
Federal Government’s resources to prosecute a U.S. citizen for smug-
gling cheap liquor into Canada.  But the broad language of the wire 
fraud statute authorizes it to do so,” and the Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion was affirmed.226 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which Justice Breyer joined, 
with Justice Scalia and Justice Souter joined in part.227  Justice Gins-
burg and Breyer expressed concern over the broad reading given to 
 
 220. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1777. 
 221. Id. at 1779. 
 222. Id. at 1780 (citing Hand’s concurrence in Moore, describing the delicacy of the task of 
reviewing a foreign state’s statute and deciding whether it should be enforced). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1781. 
 227. Id. 
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the wire fraud statute by the majority.228  Justice Scalia and Justice 
Souter joined the dissent’s assertion that the prosecution before the 
court implicated the revenue rule, and that Congress’s enactment of 
the wire fraud statute did not displace the rule.229  The dissent found 
that the revenue rule was violated because restitution to the victim, 
Canada, was required under the Mandatory Victims Restitution 
Act.230  Because restitution is mandatory when a defendant is con-
victed of wire fraud, the dissent asserted that the revenue rule would 
thereby be violated when the foreign sovereign’s revenue law was en-
forced by the domestic court, and therefore Congress did not intend 
the wire fraud statute to cover a scheme to defraud a foreign govern-
ment of taxes.231  Based on its difficulty with the intersection of the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act and the wire fraud statute, cou-
pled with concerns about whether the scope of the wire fraud statue 
encompassed a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of taxes, the 
dissent would have applied the rule of lenity and would have reversed 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.232 
The Court’s opinion setting forth the scope of the revenue rule in 
1952 when the wire fraud statute was enacted gives some indication of 
the scope of the revenue rule presently.  The eighteenth century ver-
sion that refused contemplation of a foreign statute that interfered 
with domestic trade was not a viable construction in the twentieth 
century.  A revenue rule that allows a court to decline to consider a 
case brought for the direct or indirect collection of taxes seems to re-
main a modern version of the rule, but as the court noted there re-
mains uncertainty regarding the “indirect” recognition of foreign 
revenue laws.233  The Court’s refusal to permit criminal activity within 
the United States that the  executive branch chose to prosecute to es-
cape punishment under the auspices of the revenue rule conforms to 
 
 228. Id. at 1781-86.  The dissent relied in part on the reasoning advanced by the First Circuit 
in United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1996). 
 229. Id. at 1786. 
 230. Id. at 1787. At sentencing, the prosecutor did not urge the trial court to require restitu-
tion because the government felt it was not appropriate when the victim was a foreign govern-
ment defrauded of tax revenue.  At oral arguments, the Government stated that restitution 
should be ordered, and such restitution did not infringe upon the revenue rule.  Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1787-88.  The dissent also noted that the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines determine sentences for wire fraud based on the loss suffered by the victim.  In a 
footnote, the dissent suggested that the petitioner should be resentenced in light of the Court’s 
decision in  Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), finding the guidelines unconstitutional 
and advisory at best.  Pasquantnio, 125 S. Ct. at 1783 n.5 . 
 233. Id. at 1779. 
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the United States’ strong intolerance for undertakings that are illegal 
under domestic law. 
C. Scope of the Revenue Rule in Current Controversies 
In Pasquantino, the Court found that a wire fraud prosecution 
did not implicate the revenue rule’s concern that courts will become 
involved in international relations best left to the other branches of 
government, that courts will be placed in the position of making pub-
lic policy decisions about foreign revenue laws at the risk of offending 
foreign governments, or that courts will have to exhaust excessive ju-
dicial resources in comprehending foreign revenue laws.234  A criminal 
fraud that occurred partially within the United States in violation of a 
federal statute was not allowed to escape prosecution because the 
harm intended was aimed at a foreign government and its public law 
for the collection of revenue.  The Court’s decision did not place new 
limits on the revenue rule.  Neither did the opinion expressly state the 
full scope of the revenue rule. 
The Court did state that it expressed no opinion on the civil 
RICO suits and whether such suits will fall afoul of the revenue rule 
because they are attempts by foreign governments to collect taxes 
from smugglers.235  As defined in its most narrow reading, the revenue 
rule does not permit a foreign sovereign to utilize the courts of the 
United States to directly or indirectly collect taxes due under its reve-
nue laws or to enforce a tax judgment.236  The RICO suits are clearly 
an attempt to indirectly collect excise taxes on smuggled cigarettes.  
As discussed in Part VII, the continued existence of the revenue rule 
depends in part of the availability of collection methods other than 
legal action in a foreign jurisdiction for collection of taxes.  The use of 
civil RICO suits in United States courts would appear to be only one 
option open to governments who are attempting to collect taxes from 
corporate smugglers, and United States courts have properly held 
that the revenue rule precludes such suits. 
 
 234. Id. at 1778-80. 
 235. Id. at 1771 n.1. 
 236. Contra Brendan Delany, Note and Comment, Bucking the Trend Toward EC Compe-
tence: An American Court Responds to a Suit by the European Community, 21 J.L. & COM. 209, 
213-18 (Spring 2002) (reporting that Judge Garaufis (E.D.N.Y.) in his July 2001 decision found 
the revenue rule not implicated in the suit and finding no separation of powers impediment); 
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).  
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VI.  ARGUMENTS FOR ABANDONING THE REVENUE 
RULE 
A number of authors have opined that the revenue rule is no 
longer desirable in the changed contemporary atmosphere of interna-
tional relationships and the prevalence of international commerce.  
These arguments are presented, and then, in Part VII, the case for the 
retention of the revenue rule is made.  The arguments of each author 
are considered against a cha racterization of the revenue rule as a 
mechanism for protecting courts from involvement in international 
relations and decisions best left to the executive and legislative 
branches of government, a rule that prevents courts from rendering 
decisions that offend foreign governments by discounting or negating 
their public laws, and a defense against the inordinate expenditure of 
judicial resources in parsing meaning from foreign revenue laws. 
A. The Discussion in the United States 
An early article defined three bases for the revenue rule: histori-
cal precedent; tax rulings, which are similar to penal laws that are de-
nied enforcement in foreign jurisdictions; and judicial scrutiny of for-
eign revenue laws, which is injurious to foreign relations, as described 
by Hand in Moore.237  The author found the historical justification 
unpersuasive in part because the world’s economies interact more fre-
quently, and are more interdependent than they were when the rule 
was first enunciated.238  Additionally, to the extent the justification of 
the rule was protectionism, “the effect of the revenue rule as a whole 
to encourage domestic commerce at the expense of other jurisdictions 
arguably has the long term harmful effect of reducing United States 
markets abroad.”239  This rationale for the rule appears, if at all, in 
Lord Hardwicke’s original comment that: 
If it should be laid down, that because goods are prohibited to be 
exported by the laws of any foreign country from whence they are 
brought, therefore the parties should have no remedy or action 
here, it would cut off all benefit of such trade from this kingdom, 
which would be very bad consequences to the principal and most 
beneficial branches of our trade, and is not a present day ration-
ale.240 
 
 237. Barbara A. Silver, Modernizing the Revenue Rule: The Enforcement of Foreig n Tax 
Judgments, 22 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 609, 612  (Fall 1992).  
 238. Id. at 617-18. 
 239. Id. at 618. 
 240. Boucher v. Lawson, (1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 55, 55-56 (K.B.).  
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The article further notes that the expansion of the revenue rule from 
a disinclination to consider foreign revenue laws in suits regarding 
commercial contracts does not support prohibition of the recognition 
of foreign tax judgments.241  It is noted that revenue laws are not like 
penal laws and should not be denied recognition on the same basis.242  
Finally, the issue of sovereignty is found not relevant because foreign 
states are seeking the enforcement of a judgment, and the forum 
court should enforce the judgment from the taxing jurisdiction with-
out examination of the foreign law supporting the judgment; this ac-
ceptance of a foreign revenue judgment would avoid interference 
with foreign sovereignty.243  This failure to examine the underlying 
revenue statute is justified by the presumption that taxes rarely con-
flict with the enforcing state’s public policy since all states impose 
revenue laws.244  The article concludes by advocating the enforcement 
of judgments for foreign taxes but not actions for the collection of as-
sessments not reduced to judgments in the taxing state’s jurisdic-
tion.245 
This author did not have benefit of the arguments made in the 
RICO and wire fraud cases and additionally does not carefully con-
sider the international repercussions from the enforcement of a tax 
judgment from a foreign country based on a revenue law that is anti-
thetical to United States public policy.  Although the Restatement 
adopts acceptance of foreign tax judgments alone, and not suit for tax 
liabilities, it describes the revenue rule as discretionary.246  Silver does 
not offer a sound argument for not allowing courts the discretion to 
decline enforcement under the revenue rule if the underlying revenue 
statute is perceived to present difficult policy issues rather than risk 
offending a foreign sovereign. 
In a more current article by Kovatch, the revocation of the reve-
nue rule is contemplated because the author found Judge Hand’s jus-
 
 241. Silver, supra note 237, at 618-19. 
 242. Id. at 619. 
 243. Id. at 621-23. 
 244. Id. at 623-24.  This view is not shared by the judges that heard the RICO and wire fraud 
cases.  See Pasquantino, 305 F.3d at 297 n.9 (contrasting evasion of Canada’s liquor tax with eva-
sion of tax revenues from Iraq or Afghanistan or the evasion of a tax imposed by Canada on the 
importation of Bibles); Canada, 268 F.3d at 113 (considering a tax on the sale of United States 
newspapers, an exorbitant tax on machinery manufactured in the United States, a tax to deter 
sales of an American product, or an immigration tax on a religious group).  
 245. Silver, supra note 237, at 629. 
 246. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW of the UNITED STATES § 483 
(1987). 
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tification resting on comity insufficient under present standards that 
require a generic foreign judgment to be “repugnant to the funda-
mental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforce-
ment is sought.”247  The standards imposed on the enforcement of 
foreign judgments are enforced, and occasionally courts decline to en-
force the judgments.248  Comity would be respected because the public 
policy doctrine is widely accepted by other nations.249 
Kovatch asserts that those who engage in transactions in a state 
receive benefits from the state and that persons should, under the no-
tion of reciprocity, contribute to the operation of the government of 
that state, and recognition of judgments that represent this obligation 
prevent the United States from becoming a tax haven.250  Finally, 
Kovatch asserts the revenue rule encourages United States citizens to 
renounce their citizenship and, despite the enactment of section 877 
of the Internal Revenue Code, enforcement is not possible under the 
revenue rule and those expatriates escape liability.251 
Kovatch’s comparison of foreign judgments resting on revenue 
laws with generic foreign judgments is well taken, and the Restate-
ment allows courts to enforce foreign revenue judgments.  His argu-
ment based on reciprocity is valid, but the enforcement of foreign 
revenue laws is best undertaken in the country where the liability is 
incurred to protect courts from incursions into foreign public laws.  
Finally, Kovatch seems to advocate the repeal of the revenue rule so 
that other countries will grant reciprocity to the United States in its 
attempts to collect taxes from expatriated United States citizens.  This 
problem would appear to lend itself to treaty terms rather than the 
abrogation of the revenue rule so that the United States does not find 
itself enforcing revenue laws of foreign states against foreign nation-
als as a matter of reciprocity. 
Another article attacks the revenue rule because tax claims un-
der appropriate treaties would not be subject to attack as invalid or in 
violation of the forum state’s public policy.252  Courts would be free of 
 
 247. William J. Kovatch, Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Arg ument for the Revoca-
tion of the Revenue Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 265, 277-78 (Winter 2000) (quoting Tahan v. 
Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).  
 248. Id. at 278-79. 
 249. Id. at 279-80. 
 250. Id. at 281-83. 
 251. Id. at 283-84; I.R.C. § 877 (2000).  
 252. Vitaly S. Timokhov, Enforcing Tax Judgments Across Borders: How Collection Assis-
tance Can Overcome Limitations of the Revenue Rule (Part 2), 14 J. INT’L TAX’N 20,  22-23 (Sept. 
2003). 
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making such evaluations because any challenge would be an en-
croachment by the judicial system on the prerogative of the executive 
branch, and the revenue rule could, in the face of such treaties, be 
abolished.253  The use of treaties to shape the extent one government 
is willing to permit its courts to enforce judgments imposed under an-
other government’s revenue laws has been undertaken by the United 
States to the extent the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is com-
fortable with the arrangement.  But treaties do not negate the useful-
ness of a rule that protects courts from involving themselves in mat-
ters they discern best left outside the judicial process. 
B. The Revenue Rule as Perceived by Foreign Writers 
The revenue rule is also attacked in international journals.  A 
British legal scholar advocates abandonment of the revenue rule and 
application of choice of law rules to revenue claims as they are to 
other claims and that indirect suits for taxes should be decided on the 
basis of private law rights that are not impacted by the fact that en-
forcement of the rights may result in the collection of taxes by a for-
eign state.254  Briggs asserts that the revenue rule appears to sanction 
the evasion of taxes, and a contractual claim for taxes should be con-
sidered under the choice of law regime where “claims will be charac-
terized; and choice of law will follow.  No separate exclusionary rule 
will be needed.”255  In private suits, if equity exists between the parties 
the court would not lack jurisdiction and could enforce duties even if, 
as a result of the enforcement, a foreign state would consequently col-
lect tax revenue and “[p]rivate law rights should not be poisoned by 
the existence of a public law interest.”256  Briggs’ makeover would 
permit the choice of law mechanism to prevent a foreign state from 
coming to a domestic court and enforcing a revenue law but would al-
low a broad range of private suits.  Suits seeking payments of debts 
that would, in whole or part, pay taxes owed to a foreign government 
would no longer be subject to the revenue rule, and the unsatisfactory 
result of some earlier British cases where courts refused to hear cases 
because a foreign government stood to benefit from tax collection if 
the plaintiff won, would be avoided.  There is strong appeal to the 
idea of narrowing the revenue rule so that private parties could ad-
 
 253. Id. at 23. 
 254. Adrian Briggs,  The Revenue Rule in the Conflict of Laws: Time for a Makeover, 2001 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 280,  295-96 (Dec. 2001).  
 255. Id. at 296. 
 256. Id. at 297. 
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vance cases that have only a tangential tax element, and such cases 
should not be precluded by concern for relationships between sover-
eigns.257  Briggs fails to address the concern United States courts ex-
press regarding the RICO cases and the fact that the cases require the 
courts to compute the lost tax revenues to calculate the proper scope 
of damages, and the implicit recognition such computation would of-
fer to the revenue laws of a foreign state outside the terms agreed to 
in treaties. 
An Australian scholar reviewed the history of the revenue rule, 
noting that it was adopted by Australia as part of English common 
law.258  Burgess suggests that allowing reciprocal enforcement of 
revenue debts would benefit both countries involved in an interna-
tional collection effort because it would allow reciprocal revenue debt 
collection.259  Burgess suggests that of the enforcement mechanisms 
available, revenue judgments should be enforced under the statutes 
permitting recognition of civil judgments, or alternatively the OECD 
treaty creates a framework in the Convention of Mutual Assistance in 
Tax Matters to require assistance in the collection of member nation’s 
foreign tax debts.260  Burgess generally assumes that collection of for-
eign tax debts in domestic courts is based on comity and, as long as 
the revenue law is not repugnant to the public policy of the country 
where enforcement is sought, courts should recognize revenue judg-
ments of foreign courts.261  It is this caveat, that the law is not repug-
nant to the public policy of the country in which the court sits, that is 
the foundation of the idea that courts should not be making that de-
termination in an action in law. 
Two Spanish scholars advocate adopting international bilateral 
agreements to assist in the collection of tax liabilities.262  One author 
dismissed the present reluctance to enforce tax judgments because of 
the “need to prosecute fiscal fraud and control [tax] evasion.”263  The 
other author stated the revenue rule is “anachronistic and leads to ju-
risdiction-hopping, displacing the tax burden of citizens who avoid 
 
 257. Id. at 298. 
 258. Burgess, supra note 110, at 645. 
 259. Id. at 648. 
 260. Id. at 649-52. 
 261. Id. at 645-46. 
 262. Franciso Alfredo Garcia Prats, Mutual Assistance in Collection of Tax Debts, 30 
INTERTAX 56, 58-59 (2002); Amparo Grau, Mutual Assistance for the Collection of Tax Claims, 
28 INTERTAX 241, 245-46 (2000). 
 263. Prats, supra note 262, at 59. 
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paying their taxes.”264  This author suggests extending the United 
States constitutional doctrine of full faith and credit internationally, 
as the United States Supreme Court did with tax judgments between 
domestic states.265  These discussions did not evaluate the rationale 
underlying the revenue rule including the reluctance of courts to un-
dertake roles reserved for the legislative and executive branches of 
government but rather address a method for arriving at agreements 
that can increase the efficiency of tax debt collection.266 
Finally, an English practitioner, in reaction to the United States 
RICO cases, evaluates the foundations of the revenue rule.267  Baker 
asserts sovereignty is more a description of the rule than an explana-
tion, and comity is not a concern in a world where courts routinely re-
view laws of foreign jurisdictions in private law suits.268  He notes that 
the RICO case decisions rested on the idea of separation of powers.269  
Baker asserts that to abrogate the revenue rule “risks undermining 
our existing framework for international taxation” but observes that 
this is currently under consideration in the European Union.270  The 
Amendment to the European Mutual Assistance Directive, which re-
quired compliance by June 30, 2002, abrogated the revenue rule 
among the European Union member states, and Article 27 of the 
EOCD Model Treaty provides for assistance in the collection of tax 
debts and allowed adoption of tax collection assistance terms in trea-
ties.271  Baker asserts that abrogation of the revenue rule facilitates 
taxation of non-resident citizens.272  Although Baker dismisses the 
revenue rule as lacking in sound basis, he fails to solve the problem of 
courts addressing foreign tax laws on a policy level. 
Although these arguments for the abandonment of the revenue 
rule offer alternative existing structures to permit courts to enforce 
 
 264. Grau, supra  note 262, at 243. 
 265. Id. at 243. 
 266. See, e.g., Grau, supra note 262, at 245-46. 
 267. Philip Baker, Changing the Norm on Cross-border Enforcement of Debts,  30 INTERTAX 
216,  216  (2002). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 216-17. 
 271. Id. at 217; see European Council Directive 2001/44, 2001 O.J. (L 175/117). 
 272. Baker, supra  note 267, at 217; Baker posits two examples where abrogation of the 
revenue rule would result in fairer results and better administration of the tax system: (1) abro-
gation eliminates the need for departure taxes on appreciated assets removing from taxing ju-
risdictions prior to a recognition event; and, (2) a method for taxation of exercised stock options 
that were received in another country and exercised in a second would result.  Id. at 217-18. 
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revenue judgments and claims, the analysis by the authors does not 
address the public policy issues that concern United States courts.  
Courts are concerned with the interpretation of foreign revenue law 
and, more importantly, with the problem of enforcing a tax that of-
fends United States public policy through an unreasonable tax on 
United States products, a tax on activities encouraged or permitted in 
the United States, or a discriminatory tax under United States sensi-
bilities.  This concern is expressed as a matter of comity, a desire not 
to embarrass a foreign state by impugning its statutes.273 
Nor do the authors define the rationale that supports courts en-
tering into the realm of international relations regarding recognition 
of revenue laws in other states.  Courts are reluctant to decide that a 
specific foreign revenue law is not subject to enforcement when the 
executive and legislative branches have not had the opportunity to 
consider the impact of such a decision in conversations with foreign 
governments.  Part VII advocates the retention of the revenue rule as 
sound judicial policy that alleviates the need for judges to make for-
eign policy decisions. 
VII.  CONCLUSION: THE REVENUE RULE STILL HAS A 
ROLE TO PLAY 
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law offers a narrow defi-
nition of the revenue rule: “Courts in the United States are not re-
quired to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of 
taxes, fines or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.”274  
This is the rule that led to the decisions by the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Harden and the Ninth Circuit in Gilbertson.  This rule is sub-
ject to abrogation by treaty, but the United States has declined to 
open its judicial system to the enforcement of foreign tax judgments 
in this manner.275  This version of the rule rests squarely on the ra-
tionales offered by Judge Hand and by the House of Lords in Taylor.  
It restrains the judicial system from examining and passing judgments 
on the revenue laws of another state, it prohibits foreign states from 
extending their sovereign will into the courts of another state, and it 
 
 273. See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929); Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Pasquantino, 305 F.3d 291, 297 n.9 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 274. See supra note 174. 
 275. See discussion supra , Part V. 
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eliminates the need for courts to master the intricacies of a foreign 
revenue system.276 
But the argument against the revenue rule is in part based on the 
idea that it is unfair to allow those who have avoided a tax obligation 
in a foreign state to escape enforcement in the state where they are 
located.  This may be a valid argument in a few estate tax cases where 
the estate consists of fungible assets that are easily transported.  It is 
less applicable under current taxing regimes for excise and income 
taxes for several reasons.  First, a taxpayer will generally have suffi-
cient property in the taxing state that gave rise to the revenue that 
those assets can be attached by the taxing authority.  This perception 
is based on the fact that the only case seeking tax from United States 
citizens for unpaid taxes resulted from a logging operation where the 
product was removed from Canada, and one can assume no facility or 
assets remained in Canada after the timber was removed.  But this is 
not the normal characterization of a business subject to tax in a for-
eign jurisdiction, and assets of some description would presumably be 
available for attachment.  Additionally, the majority of businesses 
maintain ongoing relationships within the country to which they owe 
taxes. 
Second, when the income is passive and no assets other than an 
investment in intangibles, stocks, bonds, bank accounts or other in-
struments exist, nations use withholding tax to collect the tax due 
from the investor.277  Enforcement in the United States is aided by a 
code provision making withholding agents personally liable for the 
amount required to be withheld.278  The ability of the state where 
revenue is created to collect taxes owed to it seems sufficient to per-
mit the sovereign state to administer its tax collection system within 
its own borders, without any ongoing need to revert to a foreign judi-
cial system to enforce judgments. 
 
 276. James Eustice attributes to Learned Hand the observation: 
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance 
before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross reference to cross-reference, excep-
tion upon exception—couched in abstract terms that offer no ha ndle to seize hold of—
leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully con-
cealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but is within my power, if at all, only af-
ter the most inordinate expenditure of time. 
James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. REV. 7, 7 (Fall 1989).  The 
effort required to parse the meaning from foreign statutes would, one assumes, be every bit as 
daunting a task. 
 277. In the United States the withholding tax is provided for under I.R.C. §§ 871, 881 (2000). 
 278. I.R.C. § 1461 (2000). 
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Enforcement of revenue judgments under the rules regulating 
the enforcement of other judgments requires that due process con-
cerns be satisfied, including that the party against whom the judgment 
has been entered was served with notice of the debt and subjected 
himself to personal jurisdiction of the foreign court.279  The concern 
that persons would flee the jurisdiction and seek safe harbor in the 
United States as a tax evader would not be solved by a scheme that 
required the tax evader to appear in the foreign jurisdiction to have a 
judgment for taxes entered against him.  If the tax evader violated the 
revenue laws of a state, that state’s course of action would lie in an 
extradition proceeding if the offense was a serious criminal offense.280 
Under the broader definition of the revenue rule, cases brought 
to enforce tax liabilities that have not been reduced to a judgment or 
cases alleging liability in a civil suit for damages based on the amount 
of tax avoided are dismissed in United States courts.  These decisions 
narrow Lord Mansfield’s absolute standard of total non-recognition 
that allowed enforcement of contracts based on undertakings that 
violated revenue laws.  The standard has eroded, but it exists in a less 
virulent form in United States and British courts.  Foreign states are 
precluded from indirect enforcement of revenue laws as seen in 
Drukker, King of Hellenes, Taylor, and Municipal Council of Syd-
ney.281  This modern construction of the rule properly excludes suits 
by foreign governments under the RICO statutes for unpaid taxes.  
Governments can seek prosecution within their own borders and rely 
on domestic civil enforcement of tax liabilities to collect tax from 
evaders.  A sophisticated smuggling scheme such as that alleged in the 
cigarette company cases involves actors with businesses in the victim 
countries.  Lost revenues can be recovered from the domestic actors.  
Non-corporate smugglers can be reached through domestic criminal 
indictments and, if necessary, extradition suits. 
The concern that underlies, at least in part, the revenue rule is 
that courts are reluctant to engage in evaluation of another state’s de-
cision to raise revenue in any particular way or to discourage or en-
 
 279. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, § 4(b) (1963).  Section 4(b) pro-
vides that a foreign judgment need not be recognized if (1) there was lack of sufficient notice; 
(2) there was fraud in obtaining the judgment; (3) the foreign judgment is repugnant to public 
policy; (4) the judgment sought to be enforced conflicts with other judgments; (5) the parties 
agreed to a different proceeding that the one before the foreign court; or (6) the forum court 
was “seriously inconvenient.”  Id. 
 280. See Zagaris, supra note 196, at 682-83. 
 281. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. 
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courage behavior through social eng ineering in the tax system.  States 
have sufficient “hooks” to catch tax evaders within their own borders 
or to capture tax on income before it leaves the country, and these 
mechanisms weigh against interference by the judiciary of another 
country.  The revenue rule, as described by the Second and Fourth 
Circuit, fulfills its function as a means of protecting courts from (1) 
interfering with the foreign relations function of the executive and 
legislative branches of government, (2) allowing United States courts 
to become enforcement arms of foreign governments in revenue mat-
ters, and (3) rescuing courts from the necessity of considering the va-
lidity and the intricacies of foreign revenue laws.282  The Supreme 
Court described the purposes of the revenue rule: (1) “judicial 
evaluation of the policy laden enactments of other sovereigns,” (2) 
separation of powers when the executive is “the sole organ of the fed-
eral government in the field of international relations,” and (3) the 
competency of the courts to “examine the validity of unfamiliar tax 
law schemes.”283  Although the Court’s decision was narrowly focused 
on the revenue rule as a defense in a wire fraud prosecution, the 
Court accepts the broad rationales that underlay the common law 
rule. 
The revenue rule fills, in the twenty-first century, a role neces-
sary to protect the judiciary from making decisions better left to the 
other branches of government and immersing itself in the intricate 
and sensitive area of tax enforcement for other nations.  In a world 
with far more international contact and far greater reliance on inter-
national trade than Lord Mansfield could imagine when he first at-
tempted to protect British trade and British courts from the vagaries 
of foreign revenue laws, the revenue rule stands on firm ground and 
should not be abandoned or modified so that courts must deal with 
matters best left to others.  Whether the courts ultimately adopt this 
stance will be seen as the Second Circuit re-evaluates its decision in 
the European Community decision.284 
 
 282. As discussed in Part V C, violations of United States laws should not be subject to the 
revenue rule because the criminal behavior occurred in the United States and the defense that 
an act to defraud a foreign government of revenue cannot const itute a crime in the United 
States offends a sense of justice that is an older common law concept than the revenue rule.  As 
noted, the Supreme Court affirmed convictions for wire fraud when the object of the fraud was 
avoidance of Canadian excise taxes on alcohol at least in part under this reasoning. 
 283. Pasqunatino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1779-80 (2005). 
 284. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 125 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2005). 
